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A
s the financial crisis has unfolded, market expecta-
tions have changed: Investors now see a greater
risk that countries with large (and likely persistent)
fiscal deficits may default on their obligations. The rising
prices of credit default swaps (CDSs) reflect this change.
CDSs function much like insurance for bonds, although
they are not regulated like insurance. The buyer of a CDS
agrees to pay the seller an annual premium in exchange for
the seller’s agreement to buy the bond at face value (par) if
the bond issuer defaults on a principal or coupon payment.
Just as the likelihood of an auto accident affects the price
of auto insurance, CDS prices reflect changes in market
expectations about the likelihood that a bond issuer—such as
a corporation or government—will default. As of January 6,
2009, CDS buyers were paying sellers almost 70 basis points
for insurance against a U.S. Treasury default. If the CDS
sellers expect to make no profit, on average, this price
implies the perception of a 0.7 percent chance of default
each year. 
The chart shows that CDS premia have risen several-fold
since September 2008 on 5-year German, Japanese, and U.S.
government securities. Three facts are noteworthy: First,
major changes in U.S. Treasury CDS rates have been associ-
ated with events that may affect the long-
term fiscal situation of the U.S. govern-
ment. For example, U.S. CDS rates rose
substantially on July 11, 2008, the day
that IndyMac Bank, a large mortgage
lender in the United States, collapsed.
CDS rates started rising again over the
weekend of September 13-14, when
Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy and
AIG sought a bridge loan from the Federal
Reserve. U.S. Treasury CDS rates also
soared on December 2, the day the
Government Accountability Office issued
a report advising greater transparency and
oversight for the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP).
Second, the financial crisis has affected
other sovereign CDS rates almost as much
as those of the United States. From June 6,
2008, to January 6, 2009, U.S. CDS rates
rose from 8 to 69 basis points; German
CDS rates rose from 5 to 48 basis points; and Japanese CDS
rates rose from 12 to 45 basis points.
Third, despite projections of very high U.S. fiscal deficits
for the foreseeable future, it is puzzling that U.S. CDS rates
should be higher than Japanese CDS rates, given the relative
fiscal situations in the two countries. The U.S. net debt-to-
GDP ratio is only about 0.462, while the corresponding
Japanese ratio is 0.878. The Japanese fiscal situation seems
even less favorable than that of the United States when com-
paring gross debt or considering demographic effects on
long-term deficits.
Regardless of its fiscal situation, a country that borrows
in its own currency never has to default because it can always
create its own money to cover the bond payments. Issuing
new money to retire debt—while still very unlikely for the
United States—normally creates inflation that devalues
existing debt. Inflating away debt is much more likely than
a formal sovereign default in which a country simply refuses
to make payments. Although markets still perceive very small
probabilities that Germany, Japan, or the United States will
default on their bond payments, those probabilities have
risen substantially lately.
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NOTE: Weekly data on credit default swap premia for 5-year government securities 
from June 6, 2008, to January 6, 2009.
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